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WHAT'S A JUDGE TO DO? REMEDYING 
THE REMEDY IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
LITIGATION 
Susan Poser* 
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN 
GOVERNMENT. By Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 2003. Pp. vii, 280. $30. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Democracy by Decree is the latest contribution to a scholarly 
literature, now nearly thirty-years old, which questions whether judges 
have the legitimacy and the capacity to oversee the remedial phase of 
institutional reform litigation. 1 Previous contributors to this literature 
have come out on one side or the other of the legitimacy and capacity 
debate. Abram Chayes,2 Owen Fiss,3 and more recently, Malcolm 
Feeley and Edward Rubin, 4 have all argued that the proper role of 
judges is to remedy rights violations and that judges possess the 
legitimate institutional authority to order structural injunctions. Lon 
Fuller,5 Donald Horowitz,6 William Fletcher,7 and Gerald Rosenberg, 8  
* Associate Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A. 1985, Swarthmore 
College; J.D. 1991, Ph.D. 2000, University of California, Berkeley - Ed. I would like to 
thank Malcolm Feeley for bringing this book to my attention, Norman Poser for his keen eye 
and helpful comments, and Jason Sutton for his excellent research assistance. I am also 
grateful for the University of Nebraska College of Law McCollum Summer Research Grant, 
which helped support the research and writing of this Review. 
1. See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as 
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995 (1999) (stating that Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss, 
writing in 1976 and 1978 respectively, "set the terms of the scholarly debate"). 
2. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976). 
3. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
4. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STA TE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA 's PRISONS (1998). 
5. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
6. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). 
7. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982). 
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among others, disapprove of active judicial involvement in structural 
remedies on the basis of either lack of legitimacy, lack of capacity, or 
both. Ross Sandler9 and David Schoenbrod10 clearly align themselves 
with the latter camp. Unlike some commentators, however, they go 
beyond criticizing the role of courts in these cases and propose specific 
limitations on judicial authority to provide remedies for constitutional 
and statutory violations. Their discussion of judicial authority and 
their criticism of plaintiffs' attorneys is clearly part of a larger agenda 
aimed at limiting what they consider to be federal overreaching in 
state and local political affairs. 1  In that sense, Democracy by Decree is 
as much a contribution to the new federalism literature as it is to the 
debate about institutional reform litigation. 
One gets the impression from the book that the passion behind the 
authors' mission grows out of their personal experiences. The authors 
describe their own backgrounds as public interest lawyers right out of 
law school, intent on changing the world. But, they say bluntly, "we 
were wrong" (p. 31). Ross Sandler began his career as a Root Tilden 
scholar at NYU law school and then prosecuted environmental cases 
against polluters as a staff attorney at the Natural Resources Defense 
Council in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, Sandler began working for 
local government as a special advisor to New York Mayor Edward 
Koch and as Commissioner of Transportation in New York City. 
David Schoenbrod was also a staff attorney for the Natural Resources 
Defense Council in the 1970s, where he and Sandler sued New York 
City to enforce the Federal Clean Air Act (pp. 25-31). Schoenbrod's 
experiences and observations about Congressional delegation to 
agencies and courts led him to academia where he has been writing 
about these issues ever since. 1 2  Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod 
are currently law professors at New York Law School, where Sandler 
directs the law school's Center for New York City Law. 
The authors themselves describe Democracy by Decree as a book 
with a mission. The mission, according to Professors Sandler and 
Schoenbrod, is "to put the remedial decrees issued in institutional 
reform litigation on a footing that will let judges know when it is 
appropriate to use them and when it is not, and to direct them to 
8. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991). 
9. Professor of Law, New York Law School and Director, Center for New York 
City Law. 
10. Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
11. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
12. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION ix-x (1993). 
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use alternatives that will be more effective and more democratic" 
(pp. 11-12). 
If the courts do not choose to impose these limits on remedies 
voluntarily then the legislature should impose them (p. 12). According 
to the authors, democracy by decree - by which they mean judicially 
created public policy in the form of court qecrees intended to reform 
public institutions - stems from the misguided notion that 
"government can be made more compassionate only if judges impose 
their will on elected officials" (p. 33). 
Democracy by Decree has two great strengths. First, it adds a new 
and important piece to the institutional reform puzzle by powerfully 
describing the role of the lawyers, particularly the plaintiffs' lawyers, 
in the remedial stage of institutional reform litigation. The authors call 
this group of lawyers the "controlling group" (p. 7; emphasis omitted) 
and argue that for political, legal, and practical reasons this group is 
given too much power in directing the course of the litigation and, 
more significantly, the remedy. 
The second and more subtle strength is the authors' 
acknowledgement that one barrier to successful remedies in 
institutional reform litigation is the lack of judicial explication 
regarding the nature of the rights that are intended to be remedied by 
the court-ordered decrees. Because the judges are not clear about 
what exactly they intend to remedy through the court-ordered 
decrees, there is often a real or apparent lack of fit between the legal 
violation and the remedy imposed. This arguably leads to remedial 
orders that are overbroad and not necessarily addressed to plaintiffs' 
protected interests (p. 101). 
The greatest weakness of Democracy by Decree is that the authors 
take what they acknowledge to be an extremely complex, 
"polycentric," problem, and propose an overly simplistic and 
impractical solution: to tell federal judges to stop fashioning remedies 
when state and local government officials break the law by violating 
the rights of individuals (p. 197). Sandler and Schoenbrod 
acknowledge that some rights, like the right to be free from state­
sponsored racial discrimination, should be actively enforced by judges. 
This acknowledgement leads them to draw incoherent distinctions 
between the kinds of rights that should be enforced by courts, and the 
kinds that should not be enforced by them.13 This solution is ironic 
since it ignores what I believe even the authors would consider the 
true source of the problem: Congress's penchant for creating federal 
rights. While these rights amount to unfunded mandates on state and 
local governments, they are nevertheless enforceable by private 
parties in federal court (p. 140). Sandler and Schoenbrod argue that 
13. See infra Part II. 
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elected officials, not judges, ought to make social policy in a 
democracy, but they also acknowledge that the elected officials (in 
Congress) are responsible for making bad social policy by creating the 
statutory rights that set democracy by decree in motion. In their 
words, " [ e ]lected officials invite judges to take charge of policy making 
in order to evade respon�bility for politically controversial choices" 
(p. vi). The authors attempt to solve this problem by urging judges to 
refrain from taking up the invitation. The fact that preventing 
individuals from obtaining enforcement of the rights conferred on 
them by their elected representatives is itself antidemocratic does not 
bother Sandler and Schoenbrod because they view federal 
overreaching as the ultimate evil, far worse than federal judges not 
enforcing federal rights. 1 4  
So what's a judge to do? Sandler and Schoenbrod argue that the 
judges should "adopt a set of rules effective in limiting the availability, 
scope, and duration of decrees against government" (p. 11). This set of 
rules is provided at the end of the book. They leave us with the 
nagging question of what judges should do if they do not think they 
can adequately remedy constitutional and statutory violations by 
working within the confines of these rules. 
To accomplish the mission of the book, the authors undertake 
three tasks with varying degrees of success. First, they describe the 
current state of institutional reform litigation and analyze a few cases 
to explain why the remedies take so long and are often considered 
unsuccessful. Second, the authors discuss the various causes of 
democracy by decree. Finally, Sandler and Schoenbrod propose a 
solution intended to improve the processes and outcomes of these 
cases, focusing particularly on the remedy. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod are extremely successful in their first task. 
Through the description of a few case studies, the authors describe the 
current state of institutional reform litigation. They discuss one large 
case study and a few smaller ones, and demonstrate how these cases 
drag on for years and are not successful. The authors' discussion is 
accompanied by repeated articulation of their view that the way 
judges handle these cases constitutes a threat to democratic, 
representative government. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod's analysis of the causes of the remedial 
problem is equally interesting insofar as the authors point to a variety 
14. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. In his study of institutional reform 
cases, Phillip Cooper concluded that judges 
simply are not in a position to refuse to respond to proper cases instituted by appropriate 
parties under provisions of statutory or constitutional law. Said one judge, "if you can figure 
out an escape from it, I'd like to hear it . . . .  If the problem is properly presented, there's no 
way the judge can avoid deciding it. " 
PHILLIP COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 328 (1988). 
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of issues and actors that contribute to unsatisfactory results in 
institutional reform litigation. In addition to the concentration of 
power in the controlling group of plaintiffs' lawyers and experts, the 
authors point to the role of Congress in passing legislation that creates 
new rights without adequate funding. Sandler and Schoenbrod also 
discuss the failure of appellate courts to define the nature of the these 
rights in such a way as to provide guidance to district judges who must 
create remedies for their violations. 
In the third task, the authors fall short of their goal. The new 
principles proposed for improving the remedial phase of institutional 
reform litigation are unrealistic and unlikely to be adopted by the 
federal judges to whom they are addressed. More significantly, there is 
only a loose fit between these principles and the underlying causes of 
the problem as articulated by the authors. While Sandler and 
Schoenbrod discuss the role of Congress in creating too many rights 
and the failure of the federal appellate courts to define the nature of 
those rights, their solution does not adequately address those issues. 
Instead, the authors offer a narrow solution that puts the onus on 
judges who, even if they are persuaded by the argument, might be 
shirking their own responsibilities if they followed the authors' 
prescriptions. 
Compounding this lack of fit between the multifaceted problem 
and the solution, is the biased way in which the authors both describe 
and analyze institutional reform litigation. Every possible doubt about 
propriety and motivation is resolved against plaintiffs' lawyers and 
judges, and in favor of local and state government officials. The 
authors assert at one point that "Li]udges and plaintiffs do not 
necessarily want cases to end. They often delight in them" and that the 
"hidden secret" of these cases is that "they are more interesting, 
fulfilling, and satisfying to lawyers and judges than almost any other 
legal work" (p. 217). At another point, the authors state that federal 
judges "tend to look down their noses at the work-a-day politicians 
who habituate city hall and the state capitol. "15 The slant of the book 
thus leads us to the solution proposed (i.e. lawyers and judges need 
major behavior modification), but only by glossing over the failures of 
local officials, and by disregarding the many successes of institutional 
reform litigation. 
To their great credit, the authors, unlike others who have criticized 
the processes and outcomes of institutional reform litigation, have at 
15. P. 165. But see COOPER, supra note 14, at 328 (concluding, based on numerous case 
studies, that "[t]he notion that the controversial remedial decree cases are simply 
manifestations of a liberal federal judiciary intent upon playing guardian without regard to 
the consequences of their wide ranging decisions simply does not withstand empirical 
analysis," and that judges tend to eschew activism and focus more on the case at hand than 
on tackling society's ills). 
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least tried to propose a concrete solution. 1 6  An exception to this is 
Professor Susan Sturm, who studied the remedial stage of prison 
reform litigation, categorized the different approaches judges take 
towards the creation and implementation of structural injunctions, and 
proposed a normative framework for structural remedies. 1 7  So Sandler 
and Schoenbrod should be commended for seeking solutions and for 
giving scholars, lawyers, and judges something substantial to chew on. 
Part I of this Review considers the authors' description of the 
history and current state of institutional reform litigation and their 
proposed solution. Part II focuses on Sandler and Schoenbrod's 
analysis of the causes of the current state of institutional reform 
litigation and how it has evolved into what they call democracy by 
decree. It will explore their proposed solution, particularly the failure 
adequately to address two major causes of democracy by decree -
Congress's romance with unfunded mandates, and the federal courts' 
refusal to explore the nature of the rights they are adjudicating. 
I. 
In the first part of Democracy by Decree, the authors trace the 
history of institutional reform litigation from Brown v. Board of 
Education18 to the present. We arrived at our present situation, they 
argue, because of an overreaction by Congress and the courts to the 
South's massive resistance to Brown, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Northern whites and Congress were 
mobilized by brutal images, broadcast on national television, of the 
Southern backlash to Brown and the civil rights movement. 1 9  
After successful passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress realized that it had an 
opportunity to go beyond civil rights legislation and, in Sandler and 
Schoenbrod's words, "cash-in" (p. 17). Congress began to practice 
"fiscal federalism" - tying federal money to state and local 
compliance with federal standards on everything from civil rights, to 
education, to the environment (p. 19). This is what set the "mass 
16. HOROWITZ, supra note 6; see also Fletcher, supra note 7. Donald Horowitz, for 
example, argues that judges should not be involved in these cases, but does not indicate how 
a judge should dismiss a case brought before her. 
17. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 
1355, 1406 (1991) (commenting on the failure of the critiques of court involvement in public 
law remedies to develop "meaningful standards for limiting the court's exercise of remedial 
power"). 
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19. P. 15; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Change Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82 (1994) (arguing that Northern sympathy for civil 
rights was inspired by Southern, massive resistance to Brown, more than by the Brown 
decision itself). 
· 
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production of rights" (p. 21), and subsequently institutional reform 
litigation, in motion. The demanding standards in these unfunded 
mandates set the States up to fail, thus inviting lawyers to sue in 
federal court to force state and local governments to comply with 
federal standards. It also benefited national politicians because they 
could enact laws that sounded great (who doesn't want cleaner air?), 
without having to worry about enforcement - the lawyers and judges 
could worry about that. Sandler and Schoenbrod underscore their 
point about the "mass production of rights" with a chart that shows 
the growth of federal regulatory statutes: there were none in the 1950s, 
nine in the 1960s, and twenty-five in the 1970s.20 These statutes sought 
to regulate a wide variety of issues, including water quality, age 
discrimination, special education, and fair housing (pp. 22-23). 
There was a big difference, however, between the civil rights 
struggles of the 1960s and reaction to the regulatory legislation of the 
1970s and beyond. In the latter, according to Sandler and Schoenbrod, 
the lack of enforcement of federal mandates was not necessarily the 
result of official resistance. In many cases, like air quality, the authors 
stress that state officials wanted to comply but could not, in part 
because the public would not pay for it (p. 30). Yet, as the authors 
powerfully argue, because the model for failed implementation was 
official resistance in the context of civil rights laws, it was assumed that 
when implementation failed in other contexts, it was likewise because 
of official resistance. This assumption, carried over from a distinct set 
of circumstances, provided federal judges with a justification for active 
enforcement of federal mandates because the judges assumed those 
mandates were not being carried out due to the refusal of local 
officials. In fact, as Sandler and Schoenbrod persuasively argue, 
official resistance was more often for fiscal rather than political or 
philosophical reasons (p. 30). 
This is the background against which Sandler and Schoenbrod 
describe several institutional reform cases gone awry. These cases 
begin with what Sandler and Schoenbrod call the "legal hook": a 
starry-eyed public interest attorney, or a clever lawyer from the 
ACLU, strips down a complex sociolegal problem to a seemingly 
simple legal issue. For example, in the case of New York City's 
troubled foster care system, the case was Wilder v. Sugarman,21 and 
the question was whether there was unconstitutional discrimination in 
foster placements (p. 4). 
20. Pp. 22-23. The authors mention other factors that led to the growth in federal 
statutes, including the repercussions of the New Deal and President Roosevelt's "attacking 
the Supreme Court," p. 21, and the need felt by members of Congress to make a name for 
themselves by sponsoring rights legislation, p. 24. 
21. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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Like many before them who have written about institutional 
reform litigation, Sandler and Schoenbrod focus on a few case studies 
to illustrate their main points and support their arguments.22 The main 
case study of the book is Jose P. v. Ambach,23 which dealt with New 
York City's overburdened special education system and whether the 
New York Public School system was in compliance with the federal 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (p. 45-97). 
It is in the context of this case that the authors introduce what they 
term the "controlling group" (p. 62; emphasis omitted). The 
controlling group refers to the individuals involved in negotiating the 
consent decree in cases brought against state and local governments 
(p. 62). Sandler and Schoenbrod observe that in institutional reform 
litigation the judge cedes power to the controlling group, often 
organized by a court-appointed special master (p. 118). The 
controlling group, made up of representatives of the parties as well as 
experts on the substantive issue (special education, in the case of Jose 
P.), is responsible for negotiating the consent decree. The problem 
with this structure, according to the authors, is that it amounts to the 
judge ceding power to the plaintiffs' lawyers (pp. 127-28). The 
plaintiffs' lawyers shape the decree to satisfy their constituents, even 
on issues not originally involved in the lawsuit and about which there 
is no evidence of a legal violation. The plaintiffs' lawyers exercise this 
power by the ever-present, if tacit, threat of running back to the judge 
or the special master, both of whom harbor the view of official 
resistance described above. This combination of circumstances gives 
plaintiffs' lawyers more influence over the final decree than they 
should have, given that they are neither specialists in the substantive 
area of the decree nor elected officials responsible for formulating 
social and fiscal policy. 
The result of judges ceding substantial power to the controlling 
group is that substantive policy is made, or at least highly influenced, 
by plaintiffs' lawyers rather than by those elected to make policy. The 
authors give fascinating examples of this, such as the simplicity with 
which the controlling group defined the term "educational handicap" 
in the Jose P. litigation (p. 68), and the ability of the controlling group 
to expand the scope of the litigation to include programs and issues 
outside the scope of the original lawsuit (pp. 80-81, 84, 139). All of this 
came at the expense of other educational priorities in New York City. 
22 See, e. g., COOPER, supra note 14; FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 4; HOROWITZ, supra 
note 6. 
23. No. 79 Civ. 270 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1979). 
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As one critic of the Jose P. litigation quipped, " 'Kids who don't have 
court orders in their hands are dead meat.' "24 
The Jose P. case study is detailed and informative. Anyone 
interested in this topic would profit from reading it because it shows 
how complex, time-consuming, political, and ultimately problematic 
this type of litigation can be. Sandler and Schoenbrod use this case 
study to illustrate their main point: that Jose P. is just one example of 
a fundamentally undemocratic process that transfers the power to 
make public policy from elected officials to a group of private litigants 
and their lawyers, under the supervision of a life-tenured judge. The 
controlling group exercises its power in a partisan and narrowly 
focused way, thus earmarking scarce resources to the advantage of its 
clients without regard to the collateral effects on other aspects of, and 
participants in, the system. Commenting on the Jose P. litigation, one 
education expert commented: " 'What you had was a road that was 
falling apart, and right alongside they were building a superhighway 
called special education, which provided no end of money.' "25 
Sandler and Schoenbrod are not simply saying that judges do not 
have the capacity or legitimacy to create and oversee remedies in 
institutional reform litigation. They are not just describing cases gone 
wrong and pointing the finger at overzealous judges in over their 
heads, as others have. 26 Rather, they are saying that judges have ceded 
their power to the controlling group, which is more partisan and 
political than any judge could ever be. Although this observation is 
not completely novel,27 it is a more subtle description of the creation 
and enforcement of consent decrees than many of their predecessors 
have offered. 
After powerfully describing the state of institutional reform 
litigation, Sandler and Schoenbrod tum their attention to normative 
issues. The authors discuss the political and practical problems with 
this system of public policy making, that is, "democracy by decree," in 
great detail and with great passion. Politically, giving power over 
public policy to a small group of lawyers and experts flies in the face of 
representative government if we understand our system to require that 
elected officials make policy and judges enforce it (pp. 152-53). It 
24. P. 91 (quoting Kay Hymowitz, Special Ed: Kids Go Jn, But They Don't Come Out, 
CITY J., Summer 1996, at 27, 32 (quoting Leonard Hellenbrand, former B udget Dir., New 
York City Bd. of Educ.)). 
25. P. 91 (quoting Joseph Berger, Costly Special Classes Serving Many with Minimal 
Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at Al (quoting Charles I. Schonhaut, former Dean of 
Education, Long Island University)). 
26. HOROWITZ, supra note 6. 
27. See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil 
Practice, 1994 WIS. L REV. 631, 647 (observing that it is the lawyers, not the judges, who 
often control this type of litigation). 
1316 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:1307 
disenfranchises voters, who cannot vote the controlling group and 
special master (or the judge, for that matter) out of office (p. 157). As 
a practical matter, these cases end up taking years, often without 
measurable success, and at the expense of other equally deserving 
social needs.28 Sandler and Schoenbrod argue that a clear moral 
imperative like the one that justified the desegregation cases is not 
always present in these cases because any moral imperative that exists 
is often competing with other equally important moral imperatives. 
For example, special education cannot be significantly improved 
without sacrificing other educational priorities, and environmental 
justice often comes at the expense of economic growth and efficiency. 
In sharp contrast to their disapproving description of lawyers and 
judges exercising power beyond their proper sphere, is the authors' 
admiring description of local elected officials. These officials are 
glorified as faithful public servants who struggle with the policy 
dilemmas brought on by inadequate funding and do their best to make 
the right decisions.29 The authors contend that intervention by the 
courts "saps the power and responsibility of governmental officials" 
and "hobbles government" (p. 144). 
In order to eliminate democracy by decree, Sandler and 
Schoenbrod propose that federal district court judges adopt new 
principles to guide and limit their equitable powers in remedying the 
statutory rights violations involved in these cases. The goal behind 
these principles is simple: put responsibility and power for making 
policy back in the hands of state and local democratically elected 
officials. The principles presume that there has been a finding of 
liability against the defendants and are intended to provide guidance 
to judges during the three stages of the remedial process in 
institutional reform litigation - framing the decree, managing the 
decree, and ending the decree (p. 197). The proposed principles are: 
1. Judges should stick to the judicial job of protecting plaintiffs 
from illegal injury .... 
2. In enforcing rights, judges should to the greatest extent 
practicable leave policy making to the elected policy 
makers .... 
3. In those rare cases in which it is absolutely necessary for 
judges to involve the court in policy making to enforce 
rights, judges should subject themselves to checks and 
balances appropriate to judicial administration of state and 
local governments .... 
28. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
29. See, e.g., pp. 51-53 (describing how public officials were on the verge of fixing the 
numerous violations of state regulations when a lawsuit by special education advocates 
interfered). 
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4. Judges should include an 'end game' in every decree against 
state and local governments. (p. 197) 
These are laudable goals, but, as always, the devil is in the details. 
One of the themes that emerges in Sandler and Schoenbrod's 
discussion of these principles is that judges need to shift the power 
away from the controlling groups and special masters and back to 
themselves (p. 199). Having reasserted their own power, judges should 
then give as much deference as possible to the public officials properly 
vested with authority to make policy (p. 202). Another theme is that 
defendants in institutional reform litigation will act in good faith if 
given the chance. Sandler and Schoenbrod urge judges to use 
injunctive relief as a last resort, only after the defendants have been 
given ample opportunity to correct their violations on their own; 
judges should modify decrees whenever the defendants have a 
"reasonable basis" for modification; and judges should terminate 
decrees automatically after four years unless the plaintiffs can come 
forth and explain how that the decree continues to repair old 
violations, or unless violations are ongoing.30 
Two assumptions underlie these proposals. One assumption is that 
there is a clear distinction between proper and enforceable legal 
remedies for rights violations, on the one hand, and making policy, on 
the other. Yet the authors never adequately articulate any such 
distinction. 31 Second, the authors assume that when judges defer to 
government officials in lieu of crafting a structural remedy, the 
government officials will act responsibly and change their conduct so 
as to avoid violating the plaintiffs' rights in the future. The authors 
assume this despite evidence to the contrary in numerous cases.32 
II. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod identify many factors that contribute to 
democracy by decree. They describe how Congress has evaded its 
policymaking responsibility by creating statutory rights without 
consideration for the trade-offs that enforcement of those rights will 
require (pp. 110, 155). Sandler and Schoenbrod also point out that the 
appellate courts have not defined these rights adequately so as to give 
guidance to trial judges who must craft remedies for their enforcement 
30. P. 218. Sandler and Schoenbrod further propose that the decree automatically 
terminate when the public official responsible for consenting to it leaves office. See infra 
note 43 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text; see also Susan Sturm, Resolving the 
Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 
810-11 (1990) (noting that the nature of prison organizations makes it impossible for prison 
officials alone to achieve "institutional self-correction"). 
1318 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1307 
(p. 166). These acts and omissions by Congress and the federal 
appellate courts are significant contributors to democracy by decree 
because they create a situation where there are myriad rights enforce­
able in court and no way to articulate limits on the type and extent of 
the remedies that are necessary or desirable to enforce those rights. 
But rather than explore these causes and acknowledge the 
complexity of any solutions, the authors essentially ignore their own 
observations and propose a solution - to require judges to limit their 
own equitable power to create structural remedies - that appears 
straightforward and uncomplicated. In effect, they treat the existence 
and role of the controlling group as the disease itself, rather than as 
one of the serious symptoms of a much more complex and intractable 
disease. In order to get from a complicated array of causes to a simple 
solution, the authors make broad generalizations about the 
motivations of all the actors involved (politicians, judges, and lawyers) 
and gloss over complex philosophical questions about the nature of 
rights and their proper role in our democracy. 
One major contributor to the growth of institutional reform 
litigation is the overproduction of rights by Congress (pp. 17-25). The 
authors include a long and interesting discussion of Congressional 
rights creation as unfunded mandates, noting that once a policy choice 
is called a right, the responsibility for its definition and 
implementation shifts from legislators to lawyers and judges. This shift 
is facilitated by statutory provisions that allow for enforcement by 
private citizens (p. 27). These provisions take away the flexibility that 
must accompany policy choices and give private plaintiffs a trump card 
over other constituencies with competing claims on state government. 
Coupled with the observation that judges turn most of the decisions 
over to the controlling group, the authors make a compelling point 
that institutional reform litigation takes political decisions out of the 
hands of elected representatives and puts them into the hands of the 
controlling group, made up primarily of unelected, unaccountable, 
partisan lawyers (p. 154). The fault for this overproduction of rights 
lies squarely with Congress, whose members reap political benefits 
from creating individual rights (p. 20). 
The overproduction of rights sets democracy by decree in motion 
simply because of the sheer number of new rights enforceable in court. 
In addition, the nature of those new rights and the remedies they 
invite further promote judicial overreaching. 
The authors contend that most statutory rights created by 
Congress are "soft rights," which they define as policy choices or 
aspirations masquerading as rights (p. 140). The authors state that 
"many rights in modern statutes are aspirations rather than practical 
possibilities. No one really thinks these soft rights are like traditional 
rights - not even their beneficiaries" (p. 140). According to Sandler 
and Schoenbrod, these soft rights are distinguishable from other rights 
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that ought to be enforceable in court and ought to trump policy 
choices, such as the right against government discrimination based on 
race (p. 140). 
It is not entirely clear how one is to know when a right is "soft" 
and when it is "traditional" or "real." One possibility suggested by the 
authors is that the distinction between "soft" and "real" rights is a 
function of whether the remedy for a violation of the right requires a 
negative or positive/structural injunction. For example, the authors 
state that "with violations of traditional rights, the courts ordered state 
and local governments to stop acting unlawfully" (p. 109). With soft 
rights, on the other hand, courts eschew negative injunctions and take 
up the business of managing state and local government agencies. The 
authors consider the desegregation cases, which ushered in the era of 
structural injunctions for rights enforcement, the exception. They 
consider the right to be free from racial discrimination by the state a 
real right and argue that "[i]f plaintiffs were thereby getting more than 
their constitutional due from the courts, there was a certain rough 
justice to it because many federal judges in the South had previously 
given them much less" (pp. 101-02). 
At another point, however, the authors seem to say that only 
constitutional rights are real rights, and all other rights are 
aspirational. They state that "the Constitution includes rights and 
authorizes Congress to enact statutes necessary to ensure that state 
and local governments honor them. These are rights, not aspirational 
goals dressed up as rights" (p. 153). They refine this distinction toward 
the end of the book by stating that "courts should not enforce 
[statutory rights against state and local governments] in the same way 
that they enforce constitutional rights or statutory rights in whose 
formulation the legislature has taken full responsibility for the policy 
choices" (pp. 195-96). Sandler and Schoenbrod do not provide 
guidance, however, on how a judge is supposed to know when a 
statutory right is one for which the legislature has taken full 
responsibility. 
Characterizing statutory rights in this manner is a key component 
of Sandler and Schoenbrod's argument. In order to get from the 
observation that the controlling group has too much power in 
institutional reform litigation, to their solution - that judges not use 
their equitable powers to enforce federal, statutory rights - Sandler 
and Schoenbrod describe statutory rights as insignificant. If the rights 
being enforced by most structural decrees are not "real" rights, then it 
is logical and justifiable to impose the kinds of restraints on judges 
that Sandler and Schoenbrod suggest - restraints such as ending their 
supervision of a decree once the defendant agency begins to show 
good faith through systemic change, even if violations to plaintiffs' 
rights are ongoing (p. 210). By describing these rights as "soft," and 
suggesting that "[a]s long as rights are honored, everything else, 
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including how the rights are honored, is a question of policy to be left 
to elected officials" (pp. 153-54), the propriety of court intervention 
appears minimal.33 Their argument reduces to a syllogism: (1) courts 
enforce rights, (2) most statutory "rights" are not real rights (3) 
therefore, courts should not enforce most statutory rights. 
This discussion of the nature of rights and appropriate remedies is 
central to the argument in Democracy by Decree for a related reason. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod argue that the controlling group is able to 
seize power and define overly broad, long-term, remedies that take 
discretion away from local actors because the courts have not been 
vigilant about defining what it is that they are remedying. This leads 
judges to remedy the violation of the right, but then to go farther and 
try to improve the institution. The authors describe this as the 
"judicial slide from enforcing rights to making policy in pursuit of 
aspirational goals" (p. 102). 
But the line between stopping the violations and doing 
policymaking, or ensuring compliance and dictating how to comply, is 
not as clear as Sandler and Schoenbrod suggest. Large public 
institutions like schools, prisons, and hospitals violate rights by 
omissions and respect rights through positive acts, such as creating 
livable conditions or providing special education. If the plaintiffs can 
show that the defendants are violating their statutory right to 
adequate special education, for example, then a negative injunction 
(stop not giving special education) may not remedy the violation. To 
dismiss anything beyond a negative injunction as "policymaking," and 
therefore illegitimate, simply evades the question of how plaintiffs in 
this context are supposed to enforce their rights. 
The authors propose to limit the type and scope of remedies in 
these cases by suggesting that judges set out the "end game" of the 
decree at the very beginning, by defining what is realistically 
acceptable as compliance and good faith by the defendant agency (pp. 
219-20). In order to know what will constitute compliance, however, 
the judge must be able to articulate what interests are protected by the 
rights that were violated by the defendants, and how the remedy will 
vindicate those rights.34 If the rights at issue are really just policy 
aspirations, however, then they are far more equivocal statements of 
33. At another point, they state that courts used to ensure "compliance with the law," 
but now they dictate "how to comply with the law," and the latter is a usurpation of the role 
of elected, public officials. P. 8 (emphasis omitted). 
34. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 249 (1986); Susan Poser, Termination 
of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 
325 (2002) (arguing that any principled limitations on judicial discretion in the remedial 
stage of institutional reform litigation must begin with an exploration of the nature of the 
right at stake); Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts? - a reply, in NONSENSE UPON 
STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE, AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 198 (Jeremy Waldron 
ed., 1987). 
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the interests of their beneficiaries than what we usually think of as 
rights.35 Thus, if judges adopt Sandler and Schoenbrod's definition of 
most statutory rights as just policy aspirations in disguise - as 
presumably the authors would advocate - then these proposals 
ultimately will end institutional reform litigation, except in extreme 
circumstances of truly recalcitrant government officials actively 
refusing to honor long-established, fundamental constitutional rights. 
One would think that in a democracy, that kind of radical 
reinterpretation of statutory rights should properly come from our 
elected officials, not life-tenured judges. 
Sandler and Schoenbrod concede the existence of this problem by 
observing how little guidance there is on the nature of the rights at 
stake in institutional reform litigation, but avoid addressing the 
problem by defining their own inquiry as not encompassing questions 
about the nature of rights. They state that their "focus is on what 
happens in the twenty-first century after Congress has spoken and 
judges are asked to empower a controlling group to manage and 
supervise institutions of state or local government" (pp. 33-34). This 
allows them to chastise district court judges for failing to follow 
Supreme Court doctrine,36 while at the same time avoiding addressing 
the fact that the Supreme Court has provided little guidance to the 
lower courts to figure out how to think about the scope of the 
violation and how to match that to a remedy.37 The authors concede 
that the Supreme Court has not created a useful way to enforce its 
own standards (p. 165), but rather than suggest the Supreme Court 
itself remedy that problem, the authors argue that district courts have 
intentionally taken advantage of the lack of standards by engaging in 
"covert policy making" and "manipulation" (p. 166). 
By looking to causes only as far back as the time when a case is 
brought before a judge and liability has been determined, the authors 
artificially limit the nature and scope of possible solutions and create 
the impression that the problems with institutional reform remedies 
are primarily caused by the trial judges who manage specific cases. Yet 
it is not clear how a judge can know what constitutes sufficient 
compliance to end a decree, without knowing what interests Congress 
intended to protect when it created statutory rights. By limiting the 
35. Jeremy Waldron, Introduction, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 14 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 
1984) (pointing out that we use the language of rights when the interests that the right is 
intended to protect are considered to be of more importance and significance than interests 
that are not designated as worthy of protection through the language of rights). 
36. Supreme Court doctrine states that the scope of the violation determines the scope 
of the remedy and the remedy must be narrowly tailored to cure the violation. See generally 
Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform 
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 854 (1978). 
37. Poser, supra note 34, at 325. 
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possible range of causes that they will consider, the authors limit the 
possible range of solutions. Oversimplifying the causes results in 
oversimplification of the solution. 
Throughout the book, Sandler and Schoenbrod characterize facts 
and events to accommodate the causes they identify and the solution 
they propose. For example, the authors discuss an incident, drawn 
from Professor Sandler's own experience, involving public toilets in 
New York City. They explain how a company that wanted to contract 
with the city to build coin-operated public toilets hit a roadblock when 
the director of the Office for People with Disabilities insisted that she 
would only support the contract if every toilet were wheelchair 
accessible, which was an economic impossibility (pp. 140-41). Initially, 
they tell this story to support their statement that "[t)he perversion of 
court enforcement from rights enforcement to policy imposition is the 
fault not only of the controlling groups that negotiate the decrees and 
of the judges that enter them, but also of Congress" (pp. 139-40). The 
example does support that statement because it shows that Congress 
often writes statutes that confer benefits without considering all of the 
implications, and elected and appointed officials, in turn, act politically 
and do not always do what is best for the general public. But, after 
discussing the public toilet fiasco, they seem to want to turn it into an 
example of court-made policy, saying, "When Congress calls a policy 
choice a right, it shifts important policy-making power from elected 
officials to plaintiffs' attorneys" (p.142). But there were no plaintiffs 
attorneys in the example, just a strong interest group with a public 
official to do its bidding. Yet, the statement quoted above is made 
without a real shift in the discussion, leaving this reader wondering 
why it is relevant to a situation involving elected officials (or their 
appointees) exercising policy choices, and doing it badly. 
At times, the Democracy by Decree sounds like a rant against 
politics as usual. The authors describe the battle over curb ramps, 
something required not by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) itself, but by Justice Department regulations interpreting the 
ADA. The authors describe how laws and regulations get passed 
because of interest politics (here, the strength of the lobby for the 
disabled) and how any decision to spend money in one place will mean 
less money for something else. But we know that, and certainly judges 
are not to blame for that. In fact, Professor Schoenbrod is the author 
of numerous articles and a book that decry the explosion of delegation 
and argue that it too is antidemocratic.38 So the authors themselves 
understand that the solution to this problem is much more complex 
than they suggest by their proposals. In fact, arguably, if the unfunded 
38. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 12; David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: 
Could the Court Give It Substance? 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985). 
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mandate problem were solved and Congress stopped "mass producing 
rights," the power of the courts and the controlling groups would 
dramatically subside. This left me wondering why they do not admit 
this and incorporate into their solution some of Schoenbrod's 
arguments about delegation. 
I can think of two possible answers to this question. First, the 
authors may recognize that it would be pointless to propose solutions 
to democracy by decree that told Congress how to act. Telling 
members of Congress to stop passing legislation that gives more rights 
to individuals would probably prove futile, for reasons that Sandler 
and Schoenbrod discuss - there is too much potential for political 
gain from creating unfunded mandates. 39 
The second, and more likely, reason why Sandler and Schoenbrod 
bring the role of Congress to our attention, and then do not include it 
in the solution, is that their agenda goes well beyond their concern 
with remedies in institutional reform litigation. This book is not simply 
about institutional reform litigation, it is about federalism.4 0 The tone 
of the book, with its glorification of local control and its demonization 
of Congress, federal judges, and plaintiffs' lawyers, suggests that the 
authors do not care how or why there is less federal authority, as long 
as there is less federal authority. Sandler and Schoenbrod's proposals 
for limited judicial review of violations by state actors of plaintiffs' 
federal statutory and constitutional rights is, in essence, a proposal for 
expanded judicial review of federal encroachments on state 
sovereignty - exactly what proponents of modern federalism have 
called for.4 1 Suggesting that federal judges cease enforcing federal 
rights is not an argument for more limited judicial review, it is an 
argument for a different kind of judicial review. In this sense, 
Democracy by Decree is as much a contribution to the new federalism 
literature,42 which sanctions searching judicial review of issues of 
39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
40. It appears that David Schoenbrod identifies himself with the federalism movement, 
as he is listed on the Federalist Society's web page as a media contact. See Federalist Society, 
Journalist's Guide to Legal Experts, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/journalistsguide/ 
mediaguide.htm (last visited July 1, 2004) (listing David Schoenbrod as an expert regarding 
presidential power). 
41. Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 158 (2001) (generally approving of judicial review of 
perceived federal intrusions on state sovereignty); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of 
Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court has an 
"institutional obligation" to draw the line "between federal enumerated powers and state 
sovereignty"). But see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that the Framers' 
federalism concerns are not as salient in the modern bureaucratic state); Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
215, 235-237 (2000) (arguing that it is ahistorical to suggest that the Framers intended 
significant judicial review of federal power). 
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federal intrusions on state sovereignty, as it is to the scholarly debate 
about the propriety and effectiveness of institutional reform litigation. 
The anti-federal-government theme pervades the book. An 
example of this is Sandler and Schoenbrod's suggestion that the 
remedial plan that is part of a consent decree should automatically end 
when the elected official who signed off on the decree leaves office (p. 
214). The authors simply ignore the opportunities for abuse and bad 
faith that such a rule would produce. Sandler and Schoenbrod present 
no evidence to support their assumption that in the absence of a court 
order, or threat of a court order, public officials would voluntarily 
change large public institutions. Large organizations are extremely 
resistant to change.43 Sandler and Schoenbrod suggest numerous times 
in the book that judges are too quick to approve consent decrees or 
issue orders that constitute burdensome requirements for local 
officials, without giving defendants adequate time to comply on their 
own (p. 205). This suggestion ignores the numerous documented cases 
where the courts gave the defendants a chance to comply prior to 
imposing a court order or consent decree but eventually entered an 
order after they became frustrated with the defendants' recalcitrance. 
For example, in Batchelder v. Geary44, the defendant, Santa Clara 
County, admitted problems with local jails and claimed it was making 
efforts to improve them. The court expressed faith in the 
government's expressed intentions to improve the local jails, and 
therefore abandoned jurisdiction of the case without ordering a 
remedy. Yet, ten years after the case began, five years after the court 
had surrendered jurisdiction, and in response to a second case that the 
plaintiffs brought, the court entered a structural injunction to improve 
the local jail because ultimately the government failed to correct the 
deficiencies.45 
42. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative 
Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 24, 28 (2001) (discussing the "dangers of 
overweening national power"); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 
(1997); Yoo, supra note 41 (defending judicial review on grounds of federalism). 
43. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CH,6,.NGE 8 (1971) 
(arguing that the barriers to change are "acknowledged collective benefits of stability, 
calculated opposition to change, and inability to change."); W. RICHARD SCOTT, 
ORGANIZATIONS 63 (1981) (noting that the "necessity of survival can override the morality 
of purpose."); Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONS 142, 148 (James G. March ed., 1985) (calling organizational resistance to 
change the "liability of newness"). 
44. Civ. Action No. 71-2017 (N.D. Cal. March, 1972), cited in FEELEY & RUBIN, supra 
note 4, at 1 12-13. 
45. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 4, at 114-15; see also id. at 56-66 (describing Talley v. 
Stephens and Holt v. Sarver, related prison cases in which the court found constitutional 
deficiencies in the prison system and issued suggestions for reform and required periodic 
updates. The judge finally took over the system in May 1971, five years after the start of the 
litigation, and only then started requiring specific responses instead of suggestions). See 
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This pattern of court forbearance followed by inaction on the part 
of government officials is not limited to prison cases. In Wyatt v. 
Stickney46 the court determined that living standards in a mental 
hospital violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The judge declined the plaintiffs' request to order 
minimum standards, and instead provided the state with time to 
respond. After the State failed to provide a compliance plan within the 
required ninety days and failed to begin compliance within the court­
imposed six-month period, the judge finally issued an order creating a 
formal remedy process, nine months after the original liability 
judgment. 47 There are many more cases and case studies documenting 
the recalcitrance or defiance of public officials in implementing court­
ordered remedies. 4 8  
The authors also fail to acknowledge that the ability of the victims 
of rights violations to sue may itself be a significant motivator for 
compliance with federal law, as well as a method of mobilizing other 
political forces to bring about change.49 This is particularly strange 
since Sandler and Schoenbrod provide an example of just such a case 
in which they were involved. In 1973, they brought a lawsuit on behalf 
of the Natural Resources Defense Council against New York City, 
alleging noise pollution from subways. The noise was discovered to be 
the result of faulty wheel design (p. 31). The authors note that the case 
was· dismissed, but that "the political pressures we set in motion forced 
politicians to find ways to bring the wheels back into round" (p. 31). 
But the authors never acknowledge and explore the significance of 
lawsuits, or the threat of lawsuits, in bringing about beneficial political 
change. 
Interestingly, the one case the authors consider successful involved 
a competent and responsible state official and a collaborative effort by 
the lawyers and parties on both sides. That case, Marisol A. v. Giuliani 
(Marisol) (p. 146), challenged New York City's child welfare system. 
generally Sturm, supra note 32, at 813 ("Conditions and practices in prisons are notoriously 
resistant to change despite general agreement that they are inadequate."). 
46. 325 F. Supp. 782, 784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1971), cited in COOPER, supra note 14, at 174-75. 
47. COOPER, supra note 14, at 174-75, 180-81. 
48. See, e.g. , HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 259 (describing defendants' refusal to 
cooperate in remedy implementation); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law 
Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 553-54 (1999) (describing 
judicial deference to defendants' proposed remedy in school desegregation cases); Sturm, 
supra note 32, 807 n.3 ("It is now widely recognized that injunctions are not self-executing; a 
court's order to eliminate conditions that violate the Constitution rarely results in 
compliance with the law. The struggle for defendant's acceptance and institutionalization of 
constitutional and statutory norms takes place through the remedial process."). 
49. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 137 (1974); cf LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988). 
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According to Sandler and Schoenbrod, the lead defendant, 
Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta of the Administration for 
Children's Services, resisted settlement because he did not want to 
cede control to the controlling group and face rigid, court-ordered, 
rules and procedures (p.146). Rather, Commissioner Scoppetta 
eventually managed to get a consent order that left him with control 
over his agency. According to Sandler and Schoenbrod, the judge who 
signed the order stated that he thought the agency did a better job 
creating a decree than the court could have (p. 149). Although the 
authors take this as irrefutable evidence that judges should rarely if 
ever impose their will on government officials because government 
officials willingly comply with legal mandates, it could as easily be an 
example of how judges do not need to impose their will on 
government officials when those officials are responsible and 
motivated to bring their agencies into compliance with the law. One 
could conclude that other cases where courts did order structural 
change involved public officials who were not as cooperative, 
dedicated, and reasonable as Commissioner Scoppetta. 
CONCLUSION 
Democracy by Decree is an interesting, informative, and well­
written book. Sandler and Schoenbrod struggle valiantly with one of 
the most difficult issues in our constitutional democracy - reconciling 
individual rights with the public interest in the context of federal-state 
competition for political authority. Democracy by Decree is also very 
one-sided, but perhaps that is to be expected from a book whose 
authors themselves describe it as having a "mission." 
The major problem with Democracy by Decree is that it is almost 
as political as the plaintiffs lawyers it describes. The fervor with which 
the authors try to persuade the reader that the system is broken and 
can only be fixed by limiting federal judicial power requires a refusal 
to acknowledge many of the contradictions and logical fallacies that 
become apparent to the reader. The most obvious example of this is 
the authors' failure adequately to incorporate two significant causes of 
these problems - Congress and the federal appellate courts - in 
their solution. Moreover, in their glorification of local control, they ig­
nore their own observation that when local officials do act responsibly, 
federal courts are more willing to delegate power to them.5 0 
Schoenbrod has written elsewhere about Congress's penchant for 
passing off its lawmaking responsibilities. Schoenbrod's book, Power 
Without Responsibility, How Congress Abuses the People Through 
50. See supra Part II (describing the Marisol litigation). 
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Delegation,51 disparages Congress for delegating its lawmaking powers 
to federal agencies. Yet, if congressional enactments are taken 
seriously as policy objectives that must be implemented, then it is no 
solution simply to tell federal judges to stop implementing them. The 
solution is much more complicated than Sandler and Schoenbrod 
admit. One can agree with Sandler and Schoenbrod that Congress has 
engaged in the overproduction of rights, that this practice has been 
burdensome for state government, and that litigation to enforce these 
rights is highly problematic, without concluding that the solution is for 
federal courts to refuse to enforce those rights. That conclusion can 
only be sustained if one believes that federal power in any form is the 
ultimate evil to be avoided, which appears to be the ultimate message 
of Democracy by Decree. 
Democracy by Decree is further proof that assessing the propriety 
and success of institutional reform litigation is akin to figuring out if 
the glass is half empty or half full. Where the authors see the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1970 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
as unfunded mandates, others see cleaner air5 2 and improved quality of 
life for a substantial segment of the population.5 3 Where the authors 
see the failure of many court-imposed structural remedies, others see 
even more failures of state and local governments to uphold the 
individual rights, statutory and otherwise, of their citizens. Where the 
authors see meddlesome, irresponsible federal judges, others see 
insensitive, recalcitrant politicians. Perhaps most significantly for 
current times, where the authors see the importance of state and local 
power over social and political matters, others see the history of the 
United States as the triumph of national over local politics, 
particularly when it comes to the individual's rights against state and 
local government.54 
51. SCHOENBROD, supra note 12. 
52. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control 
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory 
Regimes For Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 926 (presenting statistics 
demonstrating that since 1970, the air has become significantly cleaner and that " 'overall, 
new cars marketed today are 67 percent cleaner' " (quoting ENVIRONMENT AL. POLICY DIV., 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977: A CONTINUATION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 2541 (U.S. Senate Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works Print 1978))). 
53. David Blank, Assessing Five Years of Employment Integration and Economic 
Opportunity Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 19 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 384, 386-88 (1995) (citing statistics showing substantial increase in 
integrated employment settings for the disabled after passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). 
54. See, e.g. , DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 28 (1995) (discussing the 
effect that the Civil War Amendments had on the growth of federal power); Edward L. 
Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
Soc. SCI. 37, 45 (2001) (arguing that the national civil rights legislation of the 1960s was an 
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"abrogation of America's remaining federalist commitment to allow distinctly different 
normative systems to prevail in different states"). 
